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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses selected opinions and legislation of interest to
the local government laws issued during the Survey period of this
publication.1
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Perhaps the most remarkable development on sovereign immunity 2 in
recent years did not come from the courts but instead the voters.
Attempting to address the issues raised and later decided in Lathrop v.
Deal,3 the General Assembly has worked tirelessly to establish a waiver
of sovereign immunity for claims seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief.4 However, at least one bill failed to make it to the governor’s desk5
and two other bills were vetoed by successive governors. 6 Not giving up
on their efforts, lawmakers were able to circumvent the governor during
the 2020 legislative session by pushing through a constitutional
amendment that put the question directly in voters’ hands. 7 House

1. For an analysis of Georgia local government laws during the prior Survey period,
see Russell A. Britt et al., Local Government Law, 72 MERCER L. REV. 223 (2020).
2. The Georgia Constitution provides:
[S]overeign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and
agencies. The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies
can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides
that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver. GA.
CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(e).
3. 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017) (holding sovereign immunity bars declaratory
and injunctive relief claims against the State, including challenges to a law’s
constitutionality under the Georgia Constitution); see Christian Henry et al., Local
Government Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 177, 178–82 (2018) (discussing the Lathrop decision).
4. Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 408, 801 S.E.2d at 869.
5. See Ga. H.R. Bill 791, Reg. Sess. (2018) (unenacted).
6. See Veto Number 2, GOVERNOR NATHAN DEAL OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
https://nathandeal.georgia.gov/press-releases/2016-05-03/deal-issues-2016-vetostatements/ (last visited August 18, 2021) (vetoing House Bill 59 (2016) because “[w]hile
the purported purpose of [House Bill] 59 was to legislatively address a recent judicial
decision, the waiver of sovereign immunity contained therein is not sufficiently limited.”);
Veto 5, GOVERNOR BRIAN P. KEMP 2019 SESSION OF THE GEORGIA ASSEMBLY VETO
MESSAGES & SIGNING STATEMENTS (2019), https://gov.georgia.gov/documents/2019-vetostatements (last visited August 18, 2021) (vetoing House Bill 311 (2019) because
“considering the possible ramifications of a [sovereign immunity] wavier, it is essential that
the provisions be appropriately tailored in conjunction with the executive branch to provide
pathways for judicial intervention without unduly interfering with the daily operations of
the state.”).
7. See Ga. H.R. Res. 1023, Reg. Sess., 2020 Ga. House 1, 1 (proposing an amendment
to the state constitution waiving sovereign immunity for declaratory judgment actions for
constitutional violations).
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Resolution 1023, presented on the statewide ballot on November 3, 2020,
was overwhelmingly approved with over 74% of the vote. 8
With the adopted constitutional amendment in place, sovereign
immunity is now waived for actions seeking declaratory relief for actions
allegedly outside the scope of the government’s legal authority or in
violation of the Georgia or United States Constitution. 9 Where a court
awards declaratory relief under this expressed waiver, sovereign
immunity is also waived for enjoining such acts and enforcing the
judgment.10 But this limited waiver does not extend to damages,
attorney’s fees, or costs of litigation, unless specifically authorized by a
later Act of the General Assembly.11 Notably, the scope of the
constitutional waiver “shall apply to past, current, and prospective acts
which occur on or after January 1, 2021.” 12 It, therefore, remains to be
seen how appellate courts will apply this waiver to acts described as
ongoing and continuous on or after January 1, 2021, yet first arose before
this trigger date.
III. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
The Georgia Court of Appeals’ holding in Ware v. Jackson13 is a good
reminder that establishing a negligently performed ministerial act in the
context of official immunity does not necessarily establish liability
alone.14 The facts involved an inmate murdered by his cellmate while
incarcerated in the Fulton County Jail.15 After his murder, it was
discovered that the inmate should have been released from the jail three
months prior to his death. As a result, the inmate’s estate sued the sheriff
and a sheriff’s office employee who worked in the records department of
the jail. The Fulton County Superior Court granted summary judgment

8. November 3, 2020 General Election Constitutional Amendment #2, GA. SEC’Y OF
STATE,
https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/105369/web.264614/#/detail/800200
(last visited August 18, 2021).
9. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5(b)(1).
10. Id.
11. Id. at (b)(4).
12. Id. at (b)(1).
13. 357 Ga. App. 470, 848 S.E.2d 725 (2020), reconsideration denied (Oct. 30, 2020).
14. The Georgia Constitution provides:
[A local government officer] may be subject to suit and may be liable for injuries
and damages caused by the negligent performance of, or negligent failure to
perform, [his] ministerial functions and may be liable for injuries and damages
if [he] act[s] with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the
performance of [his] official functions.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d).
15. Ware, 357 Ga. App. at 470, 848 S.E.2d at 727.
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to both defendants, concluding they were entitled to official immunity. 16
Although the court of appeals affirmed the grant of official immunity to
the sheriff, it reversed the finding that the records employee was entitled
to such immunity.17 However, the court of appeals nonetheless affirmed
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the records employee on
different grounds.18
First, as to the sheriff, the court of appeals found that all of the claims
against him were necessarily premised on the sheriff’s decision to
delegate authority related to the operation and oversight of the jail to his
employees.19 Therefore, any acts or decisions made by the sheriff in this
regard “would clearly call upon him to exercise personal deliberation and
judgment based upon his experience and expertise.” 20 Such acts,
therefore, were deemed discretionary, and absent evidence of actual
malice, the sheriff was entitled to official immunity. 21
As to the records employee, however, the court of appeals found that
the trial court erred in granting her summary judgment on the basis of
official immunity.22 It reasoned that once the records employee became
aware of a discrepancy between a calendar and an inmate’s record, “she
had a ministerial duty to process the calendar in its entirety in order to
ensure that every inmate’s record, including [the subject inmate’s], had
been updated.”23 The court of appeals nonetheless found that the failure
to perform this ministerial duty was not the proximate cause of the
inmate’s injuries.24 It instead reasoned that the cellmate’s “intervening
criminal act broke the causal connection between [the records
employee’s] allegedly negligent conduct and [the inmate’s] death.” 25
Absent causation, the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case for
negligence, and the records employee, therefore, was still entitled to
summary judgment on the negligence-based claims.26

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 470–71, 848 S.E.2d at 727.
19. Id. at 474–75, 848 S.E.2d at 730.
20. Id. at 475, 848 S.E.2d at 730.
21. See id. (holding sheriff entitled to official immunity for discretionary acts without
discussing actual malice element—presumably because allegations of actual malice were
not at issue in the case).
22. Id. at 475, 848 S.E.2d at 730–31.
23. Id. at 476, 848 S.E.2d at 731.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 476–79, 848 S.E.2d at 731–33.
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In Melton v. McCarthan,27 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed
another fact pattern involving an inmate being attacked by a cellmate,
but the issue of causation was not reached.28 In this case, the inmate
yelled for assistance while holding the attacking cellmate. 29 A deputy
responded to the scene, secured the cellmate, and moved him out of the
cell. The deputy, however, failed to complete a report of the incident.
During a subsequent shift, the deputy left for the day and a sergeant
arrived to find the cellmate out of his assigned cell. Having no knowledge
of the earlier altercation, the sergeant ordered the cellmate back to his
assigned cell, and soon after, the cellmate attacked and injured the
inmate. The inmate proceeded to file suit against both the deputy and
sergeant.30
The Fulton County State Court denied both officials’ summary
judgment motions.31 On appeal, the deputy argued that the trial court
erred in finding he was not entitled to official immunity, claiming “his
duty to create an incident report was not triggered because he had to use
discretion to determine whether the incident threatened any person’s
safety or threatened the orderly control and security of the facility.” 32 The
court of appeals disagreed, holding that, while the policy did not define
what constitutes “physical harm or an incident threatening a person’s
safety or the orderly control and security of the facility,” the evidence
showed that any fight required an incident report be created. 33 The
deputy, therefore, “had a ministerial duty to create a report of the initial
incident prior to the end of his shift and was not entitled to official
immunity[.]”34
On the other hand, the court of appeals reversed the denial of official
immunity for the sergeant.35 The plaintiff argued that a policy requiring
certain staff to review earlier events and advise employees of possible
noteworthy events or possible hazards from prior shifts imposed an
affirmative duty to investigate events from prior shifts. 36 The court of
appeals rejected this argument, holding that the evidence did not support
such reading of the policy and ruling that the sergeant’s lack of

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

356 Ga. App. 676, 848 S.E.2d 684 (2020).
Id. at 676–79, 848 S.E.2d at 685–87.
Id. at 676, 848 S.E.2d at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 678, 848 S.E.2d at 686.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 678, 848 S.E.2d at 687.
Id. at 678–79, 848 S.E.2d at 687.
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knowledge of the subject incident “preclude[d] a finding that he had a
duty to inform himself or staff.”37 Without any such knowledge, there was
no evidence that the sergeant breached a ministerial duty, and he was,
therefore, entitled to official immunity.38 Accordingly, the court of
appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment as to the
sergeant.39
Although official immunity is generally a threshold question of law, 40
it sometimes requires factual findings by the jury to be decided. Patel v.
Lanier County,41 involved a written policy of the Lanier County Sheriff’s
Office that arguably created a ministerial duty not to leave detainees
alone in vehicles during transport. 42 The sheriff’s deputy defendant did
not deny the existence of the policy or that it created a ministerial duty;
he instead argued that the policy did not apply to the transport of pretrial
detainees like the plaintiff.43
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the text of the policy
favored it applying to all detainees, but oral testimony gleaned in
discovery supported the contention that the policy did not apply to
pretrial detainees.44 While the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia granted the deputy official immunity on
summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the testimonial evidence
contradicting the text of the policy, at most, created a factual question for
the jury. The court of appeals agreed. It, therefore, held, “[o]n remand . . .
a jury should determine—in light of the written policy and the
testimonial evidence—whether [the deputy’s] conduct was governed by a
‘specific, simple, absolute, and definite duty’ not to leave detainees like
[the plaintiff] unattended during transport.”45
In Hardigree v. Lofton,46 the Eleventh Circuit examined what
constitutes “actual malice” or “intent to injure” in order to overcome an
officer’s otherwise entitlement to official immunity for discretionary
functions under Georgia law.47 The facts involved a police officer’s entry
37. Id. at 679, 848 S.E.2d at 687.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Cosby v. Lewis, 308 Ga. App. 668, 672, 708 S.E.2d 585, 588 (2011) (“[O]fficial
immunity is not a mere defense but rather an entitlement not to be sued that must be
addressed as a threshold matter before a lawsuit may proceed.”)
41. 969 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2020).
42. Id. at 1192.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1193.
45. Id.
46. 992 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2021).
47. See id. at 1233.
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into the plaintiff’s house and use of force on the plaintiff in connection
with a criminal drug investigation. 48 It was undisputed that such police
functions are discretionary, so the only question was whether the police
officer acted with actual malice or intent to cause injury.49
In the summary judgement record, several facts supported the
plaintiff’s allegations of actual malice. 50 Most notably, the police officer
testified that he did not have probable cause to enter the house, but he
did so anyway. This finding highlights how courts sometimes rely on the
lack of probable or arguable probable cause in the context of federal law
claims to support a finding of actual malice related to official immunity
and state law claims.51 With a lack of probable cause to enter the house
and arrest the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s version of facts supporting the
police officer’s excessive use of force (inter alia, tasing the plaintiff in the
penis from a short distance and then tasing him again in the upper
thigh), the court of appeals held that a jury could find that the police
officer acted with actual malice. 52 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia’s denial of official immunity was
therefore affirmed.53
IV. TAXATION
This year saw two cases analyzing O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380,54 specifically
the time in which a suit for a tax refund can be commenced, and a case
concerning sufficiency to state a tax refund claim under the statute. Of
these two cases discussed herein, the authors saw one seminal case
interpreting recent legislative amendments, and one case backing the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims for a tax refund.

48. Id. at 1222–23.
49. Id. at 1233.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Wright v. Watson, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1371 (2016) (holding that because
a jury could conclude that officers did not have probable cause for a search warrant and
manufactured evidence to support the warrant, the jury could also infer that officers acted
with actual malice when they made the decision to seek the search warrant) (citing Bateast
v. Dekalb Cty., 258 Ga. App. 131, 132, 572 S.E.2d 756, 758 (2002) (finding genuine fact
dispute on official immunity because jury could infer that officers arrested the plaintiff
despite knowing that she did not commit any crime)); but see Mays v. City of Union Point,
et al, 3:19-CV-00084 (Doc. 23) (Royal, J.) (M.D. Ga. 2021) (holding that although plaintiff
sufficiently alleged that officers lacked arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff and used
excessive force during the arrest, plaintiff failed to alleged sufficient facts that would
suggest officers acted with actual malice).
52. Hardigree, 992 F.3d at 1233.
53. Id.
54. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 (2021).
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On June 25, 2021, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in Jones v. City
of Atlanta:55
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 contains no 30-day limitation period for
challenging the agency’s decision. Indeed, under a plain reading of the
statute, the only restrictions on a plaintiff who has filed a claim with
the municipality are that ‘no suit may be commenced until the earlier
of the governing authority’s denial of the request for refund or the
expiration of 90 days from the date of filing the claim[,]’ and ‘[u]nder
no circumstances may a suit for refund be commenced more than five
years from the date of the payment of taxes or fees at issue.’ Those
restrictions are met in this case. This reading comports with the
overall scope of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, which allows a taxpayer to
directly file suit, and states that an action under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380
is not the exclusive remedy for a taxpayer.56

This lawsuit was regarding a class action complaint in the Superior
Court of Fulton County alleging that certain fees imposed by the
Department of Watershed Management (DWS) of the City of Atlanta
constituted illegal taxes, and thus, under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380,57 the
plaintiff and the class were entitled to a refund of these fees. 58 The class
action took issue with two fees imposed by DWS: (1) a franchise fee and
(2) a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT). 59 The plaintiff originally filed a
complaint with the commissioner of DWS on March 24, 2017, disputing
application of these fees. The commissioner denied Jones’s complaint,
holding the fees were lawful. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the
DWS appeals board, and on January 26, 2018, the appeals board denied
the appeal, holding it was without jurisdiction to rule on the legality of
the City’s ordinances.60 The plaintiff filed the lawsuit on June 19, 2018.
The City of Atlanta moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for lack of
jurisdiction, stating the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies.61 Additionally, the City of Atlanta contended that, under City
of Atlanta Ordinance § 154-31 and O.C.G.A. §§ 5-4-1 and 5-4-6, the
plaintiff only had thirty days to seek judicial review of the appeal board’s
decision, and the plaintiff failed to meet this thirty-day deadline. The
trial court granted the City of Atlanta’s motion to dismiss, finding it did
not have subject matter jurisdiction on the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

360 Ga. App. 152, 860 S.E.2d 833 (2021).
Id. at 156, 860 S.E.2d at 837.
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380.
Jones, 360 Ga. App. at 152, 860 S.E.2d at 834.
Id. at 152, 860 S.E.2d at 835.
Id. at 152–53, 860 S.E.2d at 835.
Id. at 153, 860 S.E.2d at 835.
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appealed the trial court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Georgia, who
transferred the case to the Georgia Court of Appeals with commentary.62
The Georgia Court of Appeals determined the trial court did err in its
jurisdictional ruling, and further interpreted O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380.63 The
court stated O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 provides that a taxpayer may choose
from two alternative procedures to seek a tax refund: (1) it allows a
taxpayer to either directly file suit or (2) first file a claim with the
municipality before seeking judicial review.64 The court noted the
previous version of this statute, before it was amended in 2014, required
the taxpayer to first file a claim with the municipality before filing suit;
however, upon the amendment this was no longer a requirement. 65 The
court bolstered its interpretation by showing in the prior version of
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, the General Assembly did impose a limitation
period for filing suit after the agency issued its decision. 66 Specifically,
holding the prior version of the statute showed that “it is clear that the
General Assembly knew how to create such a requirement, but chose not
to do so.”67 Moreover, the court held that there was not any wording in
the current nor the previous version of the statute referencing the
certiorari procedure or the corresponding thirty-day limitation period.68
As such, the court determined there was no thirty-day limitation period
for challenging the agency’s decision, vacated the trial court ruling, and
remanded the case.69
The Georgia Court of Appeals on December 15, 2020, held in Rice et al.
v. Fulton County,70 that under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 the taxpayers’
allegations were sufficient to state a tax refund claim. 71 In this case, the
taxpayers brought a putative class action against Fulton County, City of
Atlanta, City of Alpharetta, City of Johns Creek, City of Milton, City of
Roswell, City of Sandy Springs, City of Chattahoochee Hills, City of
College Park, City of East Point, City of Fairburn, City of Hapeville, City
of Palmetto, City of Union City, and City of South Fulton, seeking a
62. Id. (The Supreme Court of Georgia stated the following in transferring the case to
the Georgia Court of Appeals: “[i]f the Court of Appeals determines that the trial court erred
in its jurisdictional ruling, it should remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a
proper order on the other issues raised in [the City’s] motion to dismiss.”).
63. Id. at 153–55, 860 S.E.2d at 835–36.
64. Id. at 155, 860 S.E.2d at 836.
65. Id. at 155, 860 S.E.2d at 836–37.
66. Id. at 156, 860 S.E.2d at 837.
67. Id. at 156–57, 860 S.E.2d at 837.
68. Id. at 157, 860 S.E.2d at 837.
69. Id. at 157, 860 S.E.2d at 838.
70. 358 Ga. App. 1, 852 S.E.2d 860 (2020).
71. Id. at 9, 852 S.E.2d at 867.
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refund of ad valorem property taxes based on alleged illegal assessments
of their properties under state constitutional and statutory law. 72
Specifically, in 2018, the taxpayers filed their putative class action
complaint against Fulton County seeking property tax refunds pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380.73 The taxpayers amended their complaint twice
and added additional plaintiffs and several municipalities within Fulton
County as defendants. The taxpayers
alleged in their complaint, as amended, that by appraising their
properties in 2016 and 2017 based on sales price without reappraising
similarly situated residential properties that had not been sold in 2015
or 2016, the Board violated the Uniformity Clause of the Georgia
Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the equalization
requirement imposed by O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306(a).74

As such, the taxpayers alleged that they were due refunds from the
defendants of the taxes illegally assessed in 2016 and 2017, in addition
to pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney’s fees and expenses
under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.75 The defendants moved to dismiss the
taxpayers’ amended complaint, under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, asserting the
taxpayers failed to state a claim for a tax refund. The Fulton Superior
Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and concluded that the
facts as alleged in the amended complaint failed to state a claim for an
illegal assessment of the taxpayers’ properties to state a claim within the
purview of the tax refund statute, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380.76 Further, the
trial court concluded the gravamen of the taxpayers’
allegations was that the Board, in assessing the value of their
properties for the 2016 and 2017 tax years, had failed to consider other
factors beyond the recent sale price, and the [trial] court ruled that
such a claim could only be pursued through the tax appeal process set
forth in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311.77

The Georgia Court of Appeals stated: “[t]o determine whether a claim
can be brought as a tax refund claim under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, courts
must look ‘not [at] the general nature of the ground asserted, but the

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1–2, 852 S.E.2d at 862.
Id. at 2–3, 852 S.E.2d at 863.
Id. at 3, 852 S.E.2d at 863.
Id.
Id. at 4, 852 S.E.2d at 864.
Id.
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underlying facts supporting the asserted ground.’”78 Therefore, the court
held that a
claim based on mere dissatisfaction with an assessment, or on an
assertion that the assessors, although using correct procedures, did
not take into account matters which the taxpayer believes should have
been considered (e.g., different comparable sales for the purpose of
establishing value), is not . . . one which asserts that an assessment is
erroneous or illegal within the meaning of [O.C.G.A.] § 48-5-380.79

The court held a claim is cognizable
[i]f the taxpayer alleges that the assessment is based on matters of fact
in the record which are inaccurate, or that the assessment was reached
by the use of illegal procedures, then the taxpayer has asserted a claim
that the taxes were ‘erroneously or illegally assessed and collected’
under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380.80

Further, the court held in this “case the amended complaint did not
simply allege that the Board erred by using the recent sales price to value
the” taxpayers’ properties and “used different valuation methods when
reassessing sold and unsold property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years.” 81
In construing the facts in favor of the taxpayers, the court held that
the taxpayers
“alleged that the Board intentionally singled out for reassessment and
increased taxation only that small group of taxpayers who purchased
real property in 2015 or 2016, while leaving undisturbed the
assessments of other property in the same class that had not been sold,
[ ] creating significant tax disparities between similarly situated
taxpayers.”82

The court reasoned that the taxpayers’ allegations went beyond a
claim that the Board improperly relied on sales prices for valuation or
used different valuation methods when reappraising different types of
property, and therefore, the taxpayers had a cognizable claim under

78. Id. at 5, 852 S.E.2d at 864 (quoting Gwinnett Cnty. v. Gwinnett I P’ship, 265 Ga.
645, 647, 458 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1995)).
79. Id. at 1, 852 S.E.2d at 864 (quoting Gwinnett, 265 Ga. at 647, 458 S.E.2d at 635).
80. Id. at 5, 852 S.E.2d at 864–65 (quoting Gwinnett, 265 Ga. at 647, 458 S.E.2d at
635).
81. Id. at 8, 852 S.E.2d at 867.
82. Id.
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O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380.83 As such, the court reversed the trial court’s
granting of defendants’ motion to dismiss.84
V. SERVICE DELIVERY STRATEGIES
In the last year, the Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed one case
regarding service delivery strategies, City of Sandy Springs v. City of
Atlanta.85 This case was regarding the definition of an “affected
municipality” under the Service Delivery Strategy Act (SDS Act) entitled
to mandatory mediation of its claim.
The Georgia Court of Appeals on February 26, 2021, held that the City
of Sandy Springs was not an affected municipality under the SDS Act
entitled to mandatory mediation of its claim regarding the City of
Atlanta’s refusal to review its rates, determining that the City of Sandy
Springs was required to submit its challenge of the reasonableness of the
rate to alternative dispute resolution before bringing challenge in court. 86
The City of Sandy Springs alleged that in October 2005, a service delivery
agreement designated the City of Atlanta as the direct retail water
service provider for all of unincorporated Fulton County, which included
the area that was later incorporated as the City of Sandy Springs in
December 2005; that the City of Atlanta maintained an outside city water
rate that was 21% higher than the inside water rate, and that this rate
differential was arbitrary, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 36-70-24(2)(B); that
the City of Atlanta’s refusal to review and revise the water fees assessed
to Sandy Springs customers violated the SDS Act, and that Sandy
Springs was entitled to alternative dispute resolution under O.C.G.A.
§ 36-70-28(c); and that a judge outside the circuit initiate mandatory
mediation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-70-25.1(d)(1).87 Further, the City of
Sandy Springs filed a motion to transfer venue, requesting transfer to an
adjoining judicial circuit superior court pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 36-70-25.1(d)(1)(A).88
The City of Sandy Springs argued that the Fulton County Superior
Court erred by determining the City of Sandy Springs was required to be
a party to the current service delivery strategy before it could utilize
O.C.G.A. § 36-70-28(c):89

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 8–9, 852 S.E.2d at 867.
Id. at 9, 852, S.E.2d at 867.
358 Ga. App. 604, 855 S.E.2d 779 (2021).
Id. at 606–07, 855 S.E.2d at 782.
Id. at 604, 855 S.E.2d at 780–81.
Id. at 604, 855 S.E.2d at 781.
Id. at 605, 855 S.E.2d at 781.
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[i]n the event that a county or an affected municipality located within
the county refuses to review and revise, if necessary, a strategy in
accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b)[,] then any of
the parties may use the alternative dispute resolution and appeal
procedures set forth in [O.C.G.A. § 36–70–25.1 (d)].90

“As used in [O.C.G.A. § 36-70-28], the term ‘affected municipality’
means each municipality required to adopt a resolution approving the
local government service delivery strategy pursuant to subsection (b) of
Code Section 36-70-25.”91 The court held that the City of Sandy Springs
was not incorporated until December 2005, and thus did not meet the
definition of an affected municipality pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-70-28(c),
“as it was not required to adopt a resolution approving the service
delivery strategy because the strategy was already in place.” 92
Instead, the court found that O.C.G.A. § 36-70-24 applied to the City
of Sandy Springs’ claims, which directs the City of Sandy Springs that in
order to engage in a dispute regarding water rates, a governing authority
must conduct a public hearing, secure a rate study, and participate in
some form of alternative dispute resolution.93 Therefore, the trial court
did not err in finding the City of Sandy Springs’ case was premature, and
the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. 94
VI. OPEN RECORDS AND OPEN MEETINGS
A. OPEN MEETINGS ACT
Despite many boards across the state of Georgia holding telephonic
meetings under emergency exception provisions of Georgia’s Open
Meetings Act during the COVID-19 pandemic, or perhaps as a result of
same, there are no Open Meetings Act cases to report this year.
B. THE OPEN RECORDS ACT
There is one lone case to report this year with regard to Georgia’s Open
Records Act (the Act).95 While the providers at Phoebe Putney Health
System (Phoebe) in Albany, Georgia were battling one of the earliest and
most severe outbreaks of COVID-19 in the State of Georgia, this case
continued to advance through the appellate process where the Georgia

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-70-28(c)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-70-28(a)).
Id.
Id. at 606, 855 S.E.2d at 782.
Id. at 606–07, 855 S.E.2d at 782.
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to 50-18-77.
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Supreme Court ultimately ruled that Georgia’s anti-strategic lawsuits
against public participation (SLAPP) statute could not be invoked to
strike a counterclaim for attorney’s fees brought under the Act in
response to a suit to enforce a request under the Act.96
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute was enacted “to encourage participation
by the citizens of Georgia in matters of public significance and public
interest through the exercise of their constitutional rights of petition and
freedom of speech.”97 The General Assembly of Georgia also declared
“that the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of petition and
freedom of speech should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial
process.”98
In the case at hand, the plaintiff, Geer, filed a request with Phoebe
under the Act seeking the release of certain board meeting minutes. 99
Phoebe denied the request, asserting that it was not subject to the Act.
Geer filed suit to compel the release of the records. Along with its answer,
Phoebe also filed a counterclaim for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A.
§ 50-18-73(b). In response, Geer filed a motion to strike Phoebe’s
counterclaim for attorney’s fees under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute,
“asserting that the counterclaim was nothing more than an effort to chill
his rights to petition the government and to free speech.” 100 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the antiSLAPP statute does not apply in this context because the anti-SLAPP
statute “does not preclude a party defending a lawsuit from preserving
its right to seek attorney fees and expenses if the lawsuit later is
determined to lack substantial justification.” 101 A petition for certiorari
to the Georgia Supreme Court was granted for the purpose of answering
one singular question: whether the court of appeals erred in holding that
the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to Phoebe’s counterclaim for
attorney’s fees under the Act.102 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court’s decision relying on a somewhat different rationale. 103

96. Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 310 Ga. 279, 288, 849 S.E.2d 660, 666
(2020).
97. O.C.G.A § 9-11-11.1(a).
98. Id.
99. Geer, 310 Ga. at 279–80, 849 S.E.2d at 661.
100. Id. at 280, 849 S.E.2d at 661.
101. Id. at 280–81, 849 S.E.2d at 662 (quoting Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health System,
Inc., 350 Ga. App. 127, 128, 828 S.E.2d 108, 110 (2019)).
102. Id. at 281, 849 S.E.2d at 662.
103. Id.

2021

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

207

Among the purposes of the Act is fostering confidence in government
through openness to the public. 104 The court notes that, “[t]o that end,
the Act provides broadly for access to ‘public records’ prepared,
maintained, or received by any ‘agency’ covered by the Act.” 105 As Phoebe
conceded, because requests under the Act, “by their very nature, pertain
to public entities and records regarding matters of public interest or
concern, issues regarding the protection of requestors’ constitutional
rights to free speech and petition may arise any time a request for records
is denied.”106 The court stated that, “[s]uch rights may also be threatened
when a party sues to enforce a records request under the [Act] and the
party defending the suit files a counterclaim or initiates separate
litigation intended solely to harass the party requesting records under
the Act.”107 A SLAPP action is a meritless “lawsuit intended to silence
and intimidate critics or opponents by overwhelming them with the cost
of a legal defense until they abandon that criticism or opposition.” 108
Geer asserted that Phoebe’s counterclaim should be stricken pursuant
to the anti-SLAPP statute.109 The Supreme Court held that Geer missed
a key aspect of a claim for attorney’s fees brought under O.C.G.A.
§ 50-18-73(b) that distinguishes it from other types of claims that might
be stricken pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute: a trial court must
evaluate a claim for attorney’s fees under the Act “on the basis of the
record as a whole which is made in the proceeding for which fees and
other expenses are sought.”110 The court noted that, “[t]his is in contrast
to a claim such as defamation which directly targets speech or another
protected activity that has already occurred at the time the suit is
brought.”111
The court explains that, “[t]he parties are ordinarily permitted to
conduct discovery under the anti-SLAPP statute only to the extent the
non-moving party is a public figure and wishes to pursue discovery
relating to the issue of actual malice.” 112 However, “the text of O.C.G.A.
§ 50-18-73(b) makes clear that the merits of a claim for attorney fees
brought under the [Act] cannot be reached without an evaluation of the
104. Id. (citing City of Atlanta v. Corey Entertainment, Inc., 278 Ga. 474, 476, 604
S.E.2d 140, 142 (2004)).
105. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b)(1)–(2)).
106. Id. at 282, 849 S.E.2d at 662.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 282, 849 S.E.2d at 663 (quoting Rogers v. Dupree, 340 Ga. App. 811, 814, 799
S.E.2d 1, 5 (2017)).
109. Id. at 285, 849 S.E.2d at 664.
110. Id. at 285, 849 S.E.2d at 665 (quoting O.C.G.A § 50-18-73(b)).
111. Id. at 285–86, 849 S.E.2d at 665.
112. Id. at 286, 849 S.E.2d at 665 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(2)).
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merits of the underlying dispute over the plaintiff’s claim for records.” In
this case, the trial court could not evaluate Phoebe’s allegation that Geer
had pursued the litigation without substantial justification without
reference to “the record as a whole which is made in the proceeding for
which fees and other expenses are sought.” 113
Whether styled as a “counterclaim” and brought during the pendency
of the litigation or as a request for fees filed at its conclusion, what is
clear after this case is that the anti-SLAPP statute cannot operate to
strike a defendant’s statutory request for attorney’s fees under the Act.114
VII. ZONING AND LAND USE
In City of Douglasville v. Boyd,115 what began as an appeal of a zoning
decision by writ of certiorari to the Douglas Superior Court ended with a
discourse on the canons of statutory construction. 116 The City denied an
application for the property owner to truck raw materials for a portable
rock crushing plant over a lot zoned light industrial, which was necessary
to access another lot zoned heavy industrial where the activity would
take place; this it did on grounds that this was an impermissible use of
the light industrial zone.117 The applicant appealed to the superior court,
which reversed the City’s decision, finding summarily that the City in its
denial acted “arbitrarily and capriciously.”118 The court of appeals
reversed again, back in the City’s favor, holding that, under the “any
evidence standard,” and noting that other cases hold that an accessory
use not related to the uses appropriate to the zone violates local zoning
ordinances, the City’s denial should have remained undisturbed. 119 The
applicant moved for reconsideration, arguing that on application of the
canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, since the City’s ordinances
prohibited off-site parking on property, but failed to do so regarding
accessory driveway access, such access must be permitted. 120 The court
of appeals denied reconsideration, reasserting that this canon must be
applied depending on context, and that the entirely separate provision of
the zoning code addressing parking did not justify the applicant’s reading
into another provision’s permission for such use. 121
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 288, 849 S.E.2d at 666 (see Geer, 350 Ga. App. at 128, 828 S.E.2d at 110).
356 Ga. App. 274, 844 S.E.2d 846 (2020).
Id. at 275, 279–80, 844 S.E.2d at 848, 851.
Id. at 274–75, 844 S.E.2d at 848.
Id. at 275, 844 S.E.2d at 848.
Id. at 274, 276, 844 S.E.2d at 847–48, 849.
Id. at 279, 844 S.E.2d at 850–51.
Id. at 279, 844 S.E.2d at 851.
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In Saik v. Brown,122 two sets of neighbors shared an access driveway,
which became a point of contention when the Forsyth County planning
department approved the Browns’ plan for a subdivision which would
require use of that driveway.123 In relevant part, the Saiks’ amended
complaint sought equitable partition wherein the Saiks sought to
consolidate ownership of the driveway in themselves; but the Forsyth
Superior Court granted summary judgment to the Browns on grounds
that the Saiks failed to exhaust their pre-suit administrative remedies
(namely, an appeal of the subdivision approval to the County’s Zoning
Board of Appeals as provided for by the local development code). 124 The
trial court also found that partition would be inappropriate because
partition would not fully protect the interest of the parties, as provided
for in O.C.G.A. § 44-6-170.125 On appeal, the Saiks contended that
summary judgment was improper because the code did not provide for
public notice and so deprived them of due process, by virtue of which they
did not know the deadline to appeal.126 The court of appeals disagreed
and affirmed, with the Saiks having failed to raise a constitutionality
argument below.127 Further, the court also held that, even though the
Saiks pled a claim for equitable partition, the relief sought (their
exclusive ownership of the driveway) was actually provided for only by
statutory partition.128 It upheld the trial court’s finding that, because
there would be continued easement rights to use the driveway even if the
Saiks exclusively owned it, partition would not end the dispute. 129 Hence,
the trial court’s denial of the Saiks’ petition on grounds that it was
“manifest that the interest of each party would not be fully protected” by
partition was not error.130
In City of Rincon v. Ernest Communities, LLC,131 the court of appeals
reaffirmed that zoning decisions, where they are taken following a
hearing, presentation of evidence, and deliberation, are quasi-judicial
acts which must be appealed by petition for writ of certiorari and which
preclude mandamus relief.132 In relevant part, Ernest’s initial master

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

355 Ga. App. 849, 846 S.E.2d 132 (2020).
Id. at 850, 846 S.E.2d at 134.
Id. at 851, 846 S.E.2d at 134–35.
Id. at 856, 846 S.E.2d at 138.
Id. at 853, 846 S.E.2d at 136.
Id. at 853–54, 846 S.E.2d at 136.
Id. at 855, 846 S.E.2d at 137.
Id. at 857, 846 S.E.2d at 138.
Id. at 856–57, 846 S.E.2d at 138.
356 Ga. App. 84, 846 S.E.2d 250 (2020).
Id. at 93, 846 S.E.2d at 258.
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plan was approved by the City, but it then made revisions which were
not approved prior to Ernest’s application for the land development
permit and approval of site plans. 133 The City Council heard the
application at a meeting, and respective counsel for the City and Ernest
presented their arguments and evidence. The City Council then voted
unanimously to deny Ernest’s application because the master plan, with
changes, had not been approved. Ernest filed suit in Effingham County
Superior Court and sought mandamus to allow unrestricted use of the
property and to compel the issuance of building permits. 134 The court of
appeals held that, because the City’s denial of Ernest’s application met
all three elements required of a quasi-judicial act—namely, entitlement
to notice and a hearing with presentation of evidence, a decisional process
involving ascertainment of facts and application of legal standards to
those facts, and a binding, particular, and immediate decision that is
conclusive of the rights of the parties—Ernest was required to challenge
the decision by petition for writ of certiorari, and mandamus was not
available.135
In Clay v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water and Sewer Authority,136
in relevant part, the property owner claimed that the County Water and
Sewer Authority’s (WSA’s) denial of a variance for his proposed increase
in impervious surface area on his small parcel amounted to an inverse
condemnation.137 The WSA moved to dismiss, which the Douglas
Superior Court granted on grounds that the WSA applied existing state
and federal regulations in the use of regulatory or police powers, and so
this did not amount to a “taking.” 138 After determining that the WSA’s
decision was an adjudicative one, and therefore the trial court’s dismissal
constituted a judgment reviewing the decision of a state or local agency
requiring an application for discretionary appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35(a)(1), the court of appeals concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
because Clay failed to file such an application. 139 In so doing, the court of
appeals extensively discussed, and ultimately disapproved, the holding
in Brownlow v. City of Calhoun,140 to the extent that it found an exception
to the application for the discretionary appeal requirement extending to

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 85, 846 S.E.2d at 253.
Id. at 90, 846 S.E.2d at 256.
Id. at 93, 846 S.E.2d at 258.
357 Ga. App. 434, 848 S.E.2d 733 (2020).
Id. at 435, 848 S.E.2d at 735.
Id. at 435–36, 848 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 436–38, 848 S.E.2d at 736–38.
198 Ga. App. 710, 402 S.E.2d 788 (1991).
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inverse condemnations as well as classic condemnations. 141 Thus, in
Clay, the court of appeals has now articulated in no uncertain terms that
a trial court’s decision on an inverse condemnation claim cannot be
directly appealed, but instead requires an application for discretionary
appeal.142
The court in Dawson County Board of Commissioners v. Dawson Forest
Holdings, LLC,143 raised the question of whether local officials’ future
enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional zoning classifications is an
action to which legislative immunity does not apply and for which a
claimant may be entitled to prospective relief, and the court of appeals
answered in the affirmative.144 In relevant part, the LLC sued county
officials in their official and individual capacities seeking an injunction
against enforcement of a classification which allegedly made it
impossible for the LLC to feasibly use or develop its properties—which,
if true, would render the classification unconstitutional. 145 The Dawson
County Superior Court denied the County defendants’ motion to dismiss
the LLC’s individual capacity claims against them seeking to enjoin
enforcement, finding that they were not barred by legislative
immunity.146 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that while
the official capacity claims were barred by sovereign immunity, the
individual capacity claims were not barred by legislative immunity,
because rather than seeking redress for a vote or other act by a
decisionmaker,147 the complaint was simply seeking to prevent
enforcement.148 The court went on to note that, were legislative immunity
to extend to zoning enforcement (as distinct from the making of zoning
decisions or voting to adopt ordinances), property owners would have no
recourse whatsoever to challenge the unconstitutionality of zoning
decisions or classifications.149
Carson v. Brown150 provides a cautionary tale in local officials making
assurances about zoning implications on which property owners later
rely in their acquisition and development decisions. Here, the Forsyth
County planning director confirmed at a March 2016 meeting that the
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150.

Clay, 357 Ga. App. at 439–40, 848 S.E.2d at 738.
Id. at 440, 848 S.E.2d at 739.
357 Ga. App. 451, 850 S.E.2d 870 (2020).
Id. at 452–53, 850 S.E.2d at 872.
Id. at 453–54, 850 S.E.2d at 873.
Id. at 454, 850 S.E.2d at 873.
To which legislative immunity would apply.
Id. at 454–57, 850 S.E.2d at 874–876.
Id. at 459, 850 S.E.2d at 876.
358 Ga. App. 619, 856 S.E.2d 5 (2021).
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property in question was zoned for development of 9,000 square-foot
lots.151 Relying on that representation, the developer acquired the
property for that purpose.152 Later that year, before the developer could
apply for a land disturbance permit, the Board of Commissioners adopted
a moratorium on approving applications for land disturbance permits for
lots of that size. The planning department and Zoning Board of Appeals
denied the developer’s application and that he had vested rights to that
development, and the developer sought certiorari in superior court. The
court of appeals agreed with the developer, reiterating that “[a]
landowner acquires vested rights by making a substantial change in
position by expenditures in reliance upon the probability of the issuance
of a building permit, based upon an existing zoning ordinance and the
assurances of zoning officials.”153 This, notwithstanding the absence of
representations about future zoning changes.154
The Forsyth County Superior Court in Forsyth County v. Mommies
Properties LLC,155 reasserted the deference due to the local zoning
authority’s decisions, including in the weighing of evidence through their
deliberations.156 The Forsyth County Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA)
affirmed a landowner’s appeal of a stop work order issued for failing to
get a land disturbance permit, among other failures. 157 The ZBA’s
hearing featured testimony and presentation of evidence, to which
(including supposed hearsay) the landowner failed to object. 158 On
petition for certiorari, the superior court reversed the ZBA, finding in
pertinent part that the evidence heard by the ZBA included hearsay,
without which the ZBA’s decision was not supported by the “any
evidence” rule.159 The court of appeals reversed again back in favor of the
ZBA, admonishing the superior court that exclusion of all hearsay
evidence is not warranted by Georgia’s new evidence code and that, at
the ZBA hearing, the landowner had every opportunity to make
objections and conduct cross-examinations, and so the ZBA’s decisions
should have remained undisturbed.160
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Id. at 619, 856 S.E.2d at 6–7.
Id. at 619, 856 S.E.2d at 7.
Id. at 622, 856 S.E.2d at 9 (citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 623, 856 S.E.2d at 9.
359 Ga. App. 175, 855 S.E.2d 126 (2021).
Id. at 176–77, 855 S.E.2d at 129.
Id. at 175–176, 855 S.E.2d at 129.
Id. at 185, 855 S.E.2d at 135.
Id. at 184, 855 S.E.2d at 134.
Id. at 186, 188, 195, 855 S.E.2d at 135, 141,
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The court in Thomas County v. WH Group 2, LLC,161 clarified that even
the decision of an official or agent of a zoning authority, short of the
authority itself, can constitute a “decision” that is appealable to superior
court and requires an application for discretionary review.162 The
property owner, WH Group, submitted a copy of development plans to
the County’s Director of Planning and Zoning, but the Director refused
to submit the plans to the Board of Commissioners for approval. 163 WH
Group filed a petition to superior court, asking for a writ of mandamus
requiring the County to process the plans. 164 The Thomas County
Superior Court granted that relief, and the County appealed. On appeal,
the court of appeals determined that the Director’s refusal constituted an
adjudicative “decision” of the local agency (the County), and so, pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), the County was required to file an application
for discretionary review from the superior court’s review of that
decision.165 Because the County failed to do so, the appeal was
dismissed.166
In D. Rose, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,167 the owner claimed that the City’s
sixty-foot setback rule amounted to an inverse condemnation because it
deprived him of all economic use of the land—specifically, that he was
unable to build a single-family home—and that it did so for a public
purpose.168 On appeal, the court of appeals found in the City’s favor,
ruling that an inverse condemnation based on zoning requires that the
zoning by itself result in the deprivation of all economic use of the
property.169 In the owner’s case, the remainder of the property could not
be developed because of independent reasons—a floodplain, sewer
easements, and sewer lines—not imposed by the setback requirement.
Accordingly, the setback requirement by itself did not amount to a
taking.170
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359 Ga. App. 201, 857 S.E.2d 94 (2021).
Id. at 202, 204, 857 S.E.2d at 96–97.
Id. at 201, 857 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 202, 857 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 202, 204, 857 S.E.2d at 96–97.
Id. at 204, 857 S.E.2d at 97.
359 Ga. App. 533, 859 S.E.2d 514 (2021).
Id. at 534–35, 859 S.E.2d at 515.
Id. at 537, 859 S.E.2d at 517.
Id. at 538, 859 S.E.2d at 517.
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VIII. WHISTLEBLOWERS
Last year’s Survey period featured a lull in decisions arising under the
Georgia Whistleblower Act (GWA). 171 This year’s Survey period featured
slightly more decisions, both at the state and federal level, and headlines
of a jury verdict awarding $350,000 to a firefighter in May 2021 certainly
caught the attention of practitioners around the state. 172
As for Georgia appellate decisions, the Supreme Court of Georgia still
has not provided practitioners with much insight on the nature of a claim
under the GWA.173 Indeed, one of the lawyers involved in the trial
resulting in the $350,000 verdict for the firefighter-whistleblower
commented that the lack of pattern jury instructions, verdict form
examples, and dearth of authority on other trial and evidentiary issues
left both sides with little guidance at trial. 174
Nevertheless, the Georgia Court of Appeals did publish three decisions
during the Survey period—two of which are worth noting.175 In Maine v.
Department of Corrections, the court reminded all just how important the
causal relationship element is.176 The case of Maine involved a
corrections officer who was ordered by his superiors to provide an inmate
(a confidential informant) with a cell phone relating to a confidential
operation being run by the Department of Corrections. 177 Viewing the
evidence on the grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV),
the court affirmed the JNOV holding that the evidence at trial “did not
link” the plaintiff’s termination to the whistleblowing activity on which
the plaintiff based the claim. 178 The plaintiff argued that his objections
and concerns about participating in the operation were voiced to the
warden of the prison, but the court noted that the plaintiff was not

171. See Russell A. Britt, et al., Local Government Law, 72 MERCER L. REV. 1, 244–45
(2020).
172. Cedra Mayfield, Showing Teeth of Whistleblower Act, Georgia Jury Awards $350K
Verdict to Firefighter, DAILY REPORT (May 20, 2021 at 7:08 p.m.),
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2021/05/20/showing-teeth-of-whistleblower-actgeorgia-jury-awards-350k-verdict-to-firefighter/#:~:text=you%20for%20sharing!,Your%20article%20was%20successfully%20shared%20with%20the%20contacts%20you%
20provided,allegations%20against%20his%20city%20employer.
173. The Supreme Court did decide Fulton County v. Ward-Poag, 310 Ga. 289, 849
S.E.2d 465 (2020), during the survey period; however, while mentioning a GWA claim, that
case was largely about Georgia’s law on judicial estoppel.
174. Mayfield, supra note 187.
175. The decision in Campbell v. Cirrus Educ., Inc., 355 Ga. App. 637, 845 S.E.2d 384
(2020), turned exclusively on unrelated procedural matters.
176. 355 Ga. App. 707, 845 S.E.2d 736 (2020).
177. Id. at 708, 845 S.E.2d at 738.
178. Id. at 713, 845 S.E.2d at 742.
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terminated for another four years, long after the warden to whom the
plaintiff “blew the whistle” had departed.179 There was simply no
evidence presented linking the plaintiff’s whistleblowing activity with
the decision to terminate him. No evidence linked the then former
warden to the decision, and the plaintiff failed to show that anyone
involved in the decision was aware of the whistleblowing activity. 180
The case of Mimbs v. Henry County Schools,181 involved a statute of
limitations issue.182 Recall, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(e)(1) mandates that the
whistleblower must file the action either “within one year after
discovering the retaliation or within three years after the retaliation,
whichever is earlier.”183 In Mimbs, the plaintiff, a fifth grade teacher,
alleged that she was retaliated against for refusing to alter students’
grades.184 After voicing concerns, the principal of her school met with the
plaintiff on April 24, 2017, and informed her that the school would not be
renewing her contract.185 The principal gave the plaintiff the option of
resigning rather than facing a non-renewal of her contract.186 But the
plaintiff refused to resign, and on April 27, 2017, the Henry County
superintendent issued notice of the plaintiff’s contract non-renewal.
Mimbs filed suit on May 3, 2018, exactly one year from the date that her
counsel received the superintendent’s April 27th notice. As the court
explained, however, this meant she filed suit just a few days too late. The
principal had made a definitive decision of not renewing her contract, and
the plaintiff learned of this at least as early as the April 24, 2017 meeting.
Then on April 27, 2017, the plaintiff learned that the alleged retaliation
had actually materialized when the superintendent issued the written
notice of non-renewal.187 Thus, the plaintiff had discovered the alleged
retaliation more than one year from the date she filed suit. Interestingly
though, the court was quite cryptic as to whether the April 24 or April 27
date controlled.188
179. Id. at 712, 845 S.E.2d at 741.
180. Id.
181. 359 Ga. App. 299, 857 S.E.2d 286 (2021).
182. Id. at 299, 857 S.E.2d at 287.
183. O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(e)(1) (emphasis added).
184. Mimbs, 359 Ga. App at 299, 857 S.E.2d at 287.
185. Id. at 300–01, 857 S.E.2d at 288.
186. Id. at 301, 857 S.E.2d at 288.
187. Id.
188. The court perhaps sidestepped the issue since the plaintiff did not file suit until
more than one year after the April 27 date. In a footnote, the court distinguished Albers v.
Ga. Bd. of Regents, 330 Ga. App. 58, 766 S.E.2d 520 (2014), noting that in Albers testimony
existed showing that the termination had not actually been finalized. Mimbs, 359 Ga. App.
at 303, 857 S.E.2d at 289 n.1.
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The Eleventh Circuit’s per curiam decision in West v. City of Albany,189
is perhaps the most illuminating decision in the Survey period. Though
an unpublished federal court decision, the decision nonetheless sheds
light on an issue that has not been fully explored. West involved an aspect
of the second prima facie element of a GWA claim: that the whistleblower
(a) disclose or otherwise object to (b) a violation of or noncompliance with
a law, rule, or regulation.190 Do internal policies or procedures count as a
law, rule, or regulation? The court in West answered no.191 Similar to the
alleged violations of internal protocols in Coward v. MCG Health, Inc.,192
the plaintiff in West disclosed alleged violations of lax cash-control
protocols within the City of Albany.193 So West reiterates that it is not
enough for the plaintiff to point to conduct that does not necessarily
amount to illegal activity.194 Indeed, West addresses that which the
Georgia Court of Appeals pretermitted in Maine.195

189. 830 F. App’x 588, 597–98 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
190. Id. at 592.
191. Id. at 598.
192. 342 Ga. App. 316, 802 S.E.2d 396 (2017). The Coward case is only physical
precedent in Georgia, and thus, its holding is only persuasive.
193. West, 830 F. App’x at 598.
194. Id.
195. See Maine, 355 Ga. App. at 710–11, 845 S.E.2d at 739 (assuming without deciding
that the failure to adhere to the department policy of requiring written authorization
constituted a violation of a law, rule, or regulation).

